. But as our examples show, this creates challenges for society, government and ultimately industry if the only response taken is to exit a market. The ACY model underlines the importance of continuous efforts to address underlying risks, monitor trends and seek innovative solutions to prevent EHMEs triggering sudden withdrawals or steep price hikes. This needs to include broader measures, often not under direct control of the insurance industry, such as adjustments to building standards, stringent land-use planning, and policyholders investing in risk mitigation measures, which would all contribute to minimizing the scope of a risk reassessment after an EHME and would secure affordability and availability of future cover. Most importantly, this is a continuous process that requires monitoring, learning and innovating. This comes at a cost to the industry, but it is a necessary investment to secure future markets.
A dynamic vision capturing how societal resilience evolves over time is absent in current international riskreduction frameworks 15 . Considering the dynamics of resilience along the phases of the adaptive cycle could help insurers and governments to design effective MSPs, reducing the costs of existing and future insurance schemes and securing future insurability. ❐ 4, 5 and J. Gascoigne T he historic 2015 climate summit in Paris galvanized global commitments to an ambitious yet vaguely defined goal of climate stabilization. At the same time, some scientists argue that the modelbased scenarios with 1.5 °C and even 2 °C temperature change targets seem unattainable and detached from current political realities 1, 2 . Here we scrutinize the dominant climate mitigation scenario archetype that projects low global decarbonization rates in the first half of this century followed by large negative emissions in the second half, thanks to carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies 3 . We call this approach to mitigation timing the 'LateCentury CDR' scenario archetype (Fig. 1a) . This archetype is consistent with nearly all of 2 °C scenarios covered by the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) 4 , 87% of which deploy CDR technologies in the second half of the century 5 . Following this predominant archetype might not only turn out to be a risky strategy, but may lead to significant environmental damages and may also be economically inefficient. In Late-Century CDR scenarios, CDR mostly in the form of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) typically removes the equivalent of 20 years of current GHG emissions to reverse the temporary GHG budget overshoot that is tolerated earlier on 6 . The challenges and uncertainties associated with CDR are well described in the scientific literature 5, 7 , yet the scientific and political debate addressing the consequences of large-scale and late deployment of CDR as a backstop strategy is only at an early stage. We argue that a new set of scenarios needs to be generated and analysed to inform the policy process on robust timing of climate mitigation, with the aim of avoiding negative side effects. Essentially, three attributes characterize such budget-constrained scenarios: the timing and magnitude of global peak net emissions and the speed of decline thereafter; the maximum amount of allowable deployment of biomass-based CDRs; and an admissible risk threshold associated with a temperature overshoot.
Fossil decarbonization rates
A recent climate mitigation assessment has suggested a road-map for decarbonization consistent with 1.5 °C warming to be governed by a 'carbon law' requiring a 2020 emission peak, halving emissions every decade thereafter and deploying BECCS to the extent of half of today's emissions in 2100 (ref. 8 ). We represent this approach in our 'Rapid Decarbonization' archetype (Fig. 1b) . Our calculations confirm that such a carbon law based on a 10-year half-life period could substantially reduce the amount of CDR required (Fig. 1b) , a calculation backed by more complex studies with restricted BECCS deployment and no short-term mitigation delays 9 . Despite their desirability, rapid emission reductions face some real-world challenges, including inertia in the energy system, failure to coordinate mitigation targets at the global or national level, and upward trends in emissions from non-point and non-CO 2 greenhouse gas sources -all of which underpin the rationale for CDR.
More sophisticated modelling approaches incorporate such challenges and yield less optimistic fossil decarbonization rates. For example the scenarios combining shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) and representative concentration pathways (RCP) 3 span a range from relatively fast mitigation (for example, SSP1) to scenarios with a delayed response. Depending on the storyline underlying their levels of mitigation challenges, the 2 °C-compatible scenarios are characterized by half-life periods of 20 years and more. Higher obstacles to fossil decarbonization take place at the cost of potentially large-scale deployment of BECCS in the late twenty-first century (see Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2). More than 85% of these scenarios show maximum BECCS capacity in 2100 and primary bioenergy supplying an amount equivalent to roughly 80% of current total primary energy demand. In currently prevailing climate mitigation scenarios from the IPCC AR5 for the 1.5 °C and 2 °C targets, BECCS is peaking at colossal rates of 8-20 Gt CO 2 per year at the end of the century. Another strong assumption underlying a large share of these scenarios (and more than 80% of the RCP2.6 scenarios) is that net carbon emissions peak in 2020. A later peak of net emissions necessitates an even higher BECCS deployment at the end of the century, shown in Fig. 2 .
late peak BeCCS
For a number of reasons, late-century peak BECCS is problematic. The large-scale deployment of BECCS might turn out to be environmentally and socially damaging and thereby not be consistent with the very objective of the UNFCCC and the sustainable development goals. Depending on the specific scenario 10 , 200-1,100 million ha (SSP2) to up to 1,500 million ha (SSP4; amounting to almost all of current global cropland area 11 ) are expected to be allocated to energy crop in the RCP2.6 scenarios. These allocations carry a largely unknown carbon debt and large-scale impacts on ecosystems functions such as biodiversity, water and nutrient cycling, and regional climate attenuation. Most of the damaging conversion is planned to happen in the last three decades before 2100, at a time when the pressure on landbased natural capital assets is likely to be high, but still difficult to assess based on current drivers. Furthermore, land-based mitigation in combination with BECCS might have a strong impact on food prices, which could be associated with food security even later in the century 12, 13 . End-of-century peak BECCS would lead to large-scale stranded assets. BECCS is associated with building significant amounts of fixed technical capital in terms of largescale plantations, biomass transportation infrastructures, geological storages, CO 2 pipelines and CCS installations. Latecentury peak of BECCS capacity once the temperature change target is reached in 2100 leads to a situation where BECCS is no longer needed in the year 2101, unless the UNFCCC at its 100-year anniversary decides to go for an even lower temperature change target for the twenty-second century.
Late-century peak BECCS is also a consequence of an overshoot in cumulative emissions, which may be associated with feedback effects from the earth system 14 , both with the risk of passing a dangerous temperature threshold (for example, ice-sheet melting, thawing of permafrost, or feedbacks from the carbon cycle induced by other greenhouse gases) 15 and with the well-known feature of the carbon cycle that if CO 2 decreases steeply, the ocean and natural ecosystems will switch from being sinks to sources 16 . Finally, late-peak BECCS (or other CDRs, such as direct air capture (DAC) or enhanced weathering) means that we substantially rely on technologies that are still in their infancy 5, 17 and whose risks under large-scale deployment have not been explored fully, or may prove not be scalable.
reasons for early CDr
The above arguments point to the undesirability of the currently dominant Late-Century CDR climate mitigation archetype. However, early deployment of BECCS in deterministic and perfect foresight scenarios does not occur due to discounting over a 100-year time horizon. Discounting in conjunction with a limited carbon budget induces an exponentially increasing carbon price 18 , reflecting a time preference for deferring investments at typically 5% per annum.
There are a number of compelling reasons for early deployment, and thus substantially reduced peak deployment, of CDR. In fact, the original concept of CDR deployment was framed in a climate risk management framework with anticipative implementation of recarbonization measures of landscapes, optionally to be augmented by BECCS and other forms of long-term carbon storage later, if climate change risk signals become eminent 19 . Also in cases where an overshoot is found to be too risky from a climate science perspective, deployment of early CDR becomes more valuable 20 . Finally there is the argument of intergenerational equity to carry the burden The level of performance is visually supported by a colour gradient from green (good performance) to red (bad performance). Different time horizons for the peak of net carbon emissions illustrate the value of early action. Peak 2020 is illustrated in Fig. 1 , peak 2025 in Supplementary Fig. 3 . The prevalent Late-Century CDR archetype, if delayed, would require BECCS to be initiated not long after 2030, culminating in a 116 Gt C cumulative emission overshoot, thereby potentially creating stranded assets to the extent of roughly two-thirds of our present primary energy consumption and requiring CDR technologies to recapture the equivalent of more than 10 years of present emissions between 2080 and 2100. Only the undelayed Rapid Decarbonization scenario and the No Overshoot scenario are characterized by lower BECCS capacities in the second half of the century, the latter relying on heavy deployment of other negative emissions technologies, if mitigation is delayed. comment of mitigation efforts. Early decarbonization (Fig. 1b) of the fossil sector will minimize or avoid the need to deploy engineered CDR technologies, which potentially represents a mitigation of economic and environmental costs to be incurred by a generation just being born. For mitigation pathways where engineered CDR is unavoidable (for example, the Paris Agreement) the application of an intergenerational equity principle would suggest spreading the deployment of engineered CDR more evenly, but at much smaller deployment rates, within the twenty-first century.
alternative archetypes
In addition to the existing Late-Century CDR archetype and the recently introduced Rapid Decarbonization approach, we suggest the production of new scenarios along alternative archetypes. These archetypes are characterized by early deployment of mostly biological and terrestrial CDR, which might deliver important ecosystem services by recarbonizing landscapes. We illustrate all archetypes of climate mitigation pathways in Fig. 1 and benchmark these in Fig. 2 . Moreover, we quantify the value of early action with respect to mitigation by comparing 'peak 2020' archetypes to the same scenarios where only the peak of net emissions is delayed from 2020 to 2025 followed by a carbon law for fossil emission phase-out effective from 2030 (see Supplementary Fig. 3 ). For a detailed discussion on the construction of these scenarios see Supplementary Information.
The 'No Overshoot' archetype ( Fig. 1c ) avoids exceedance of the cumulative emissions budget by early introduction of CDR. This archetype is most conservative with respect to the need to resort to a CDR backstop later in the century. The 'Minimize CDR' archetype is about early deployment and ramping-up BECCS to an allowable maximum to be maintained throughout the century (Fig. 1d ). This strategy minimizes the peak CDR capacity, but still has an overshoot in cumulative emissions. These two new archetypes show similar early BECCS deployment, resulting in an option to choose between two alternative pathways between 2030 and 2040. At that point in time new findings from climate science and technological innovation could be incorporated to refine the negative emission strategy (for example, deployment of DAC instead of BECCS). Like the majority of RCP2.6 scenarios ( Supplementary Fig. 1 ), the Late-Century CDR archetype as well as the two new archetypes are based on half-life periods of 25 years, while the Rapid Decarbonization type is characterized by a 10-year carbon law.
In Fig. 2 , the level of performance of all archetypes in each benchmark category is visually supported by a colour gradient from green (good performance) to red (bad performance). The discounted costminimizing Late-Century CDR archetype is outperformed in each of the selected benchmark categories. No Overshoot minimizes stranded assets and the risk associated with temperature overshoots at potentially large near-term costs for early and large-scale CDR (including DAC). Minimize CDR represents a trade-off between benchmark performance and necessary investments to achieve moderate levels of CDR. Rapid Decarbonization, if applied early, could essentially make CDR obsolete. However, if delayed, its environmental and socio-economic impact depends on the CDR strategy at hand. Combined with end-ofcentury BECCS, as proposed by Rockström et al. 8 , it would lead to an essential increase in the overshoot level and potential stranded assets. The effect of delaying peak annual net emissions for only 5 years is striking for all of the archetypes leading to extreme figures especially for the Late-Century CDR archetype, such as an alarming overshoot level of 116 Gt C and a potential natural land loss of 33% compared to levels seen in 2000.
Conclusion
We conclude that the timing of mitigation actions, in particular of negative emission technologies, needs to be urgently revisited in the analyses of ambitious climate targets. We argue that considerations of both intergenerational equity and climate/ environment safety motivate early and moderate -rather than extremedeployment of negative emission technologies as well as a timely peak in net carbon emissions as early as 2020. As a consequence all of the near-term and mid-century net emission reduction, targets should be reformulated to include targets of early action on CDR technology portfolios. Furthermore, our calculations point to significant indirect land use effects and other cascading impacts of delayed actions in phasing out fossil fuel emissions. There is an inter-temporal substitution between sluggish fossil fuel emissions today and undesirable land use and food system impacts later. Policy assessments informing near-term technology preferences should therefore account for such lagged environmental and social external costs.
Yet, early development of CDRs will be associated with significant policy challenges as witnessed by the debates around biofuels 21 , avoided deforestation and forest carbon sequestration 22 . Transforming the 570 million farms to be climate smart and incentivizing 1.6 billion people who economically depend on forests to become early movers in No Overshoot and Minimize CDR scenarios is a formidable global policy challenge. We call for a discourse on effective strategies, starting with more detailed global gap assessments of the archetypes, and then mainstreaming the gained insights into Nationally Determined Contributions and implementation plans. ❐ Michael Obersteiner
